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ENSURING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD IN SERVICE PROVISION 
THE REQUIREMENT OF LIBERALIZATION OF SERVICE 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Simon Tans* 
 
 
One cannot legally compare European Union (EU) law provisions with World 
Trade Organization (WTO) law provisions, however comparing with an instruc-
tive or informative aim can be constructive and revealing.1 Against the back-
ground of the aim to reach a level playing field through international trade 
liberalization to be implemented in the sensitive policy fields of immigration 
and the labour market, this paper will examine the difference in effect on, and 
implementation of, EU and WTO law in the Dutch legal order. As will be de-
scribed, a strong tension exists between trade liberalization on the one hand, 
and national immigration and labour market policies on the other. It should be 
emphasized that this paper will focused on this general aim and not on specific 
obligations. Moreover, while thinking regarding service migration is influenced 
by security issues as well, that issue will not be discussed here. 
1. Rationale of the two Treaties, the aim of liberalization 
The choice of a historical departure point is by definition arbitrary, yet the im-
pact of the First and Second World War on international cooperation, and 
international trade as a means to reach that cooperation, can hardly be over-
estimated. The origins of both the WTO and the EU can be traced to the great 
wars in the twentieth century, the political, economical and monetary situation 
prior to their outbreak and the desire to create lasting peace through interna-
tional cooperation at the end of both wars.2 
Where the United Nations concerns international politics and security issues, 
the Bretton Woods system and the GATT can be seen as initiatives aimed at 
                                         
*  s.tans@jur.ru.nl. 
1  Irwin and Weiler emphasize the different telos and the equally different economy of the 
EU and WTO founding treaties, yet comparisons may nevertheless be instructive, Irwin & 
Weiler 2008, p. 101. Examples of studies comparing these international legal orders 
from the perspective of temporary service provision are: Guild 2008 and Persin 2008. 
2  Craig and De Búrca point out that while most accounts regarding European integration 
choose the Second World War as a starting point, this important moment in history 
should be placed in a much longer time-frame, Craig & De Búrca 2008, p. 4. 
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preventing the economic and monetary conditions of the previous decades 
which contributed greatly to the outbreak of the two world wars.3 
Similarly, the idea of a united Europe has been submitted in proposals by 
various authors since the seventeenth century and the First World War gave a 
push towards thinking on European union as a means towards ending the con-
stant cycles of war that have plagued the continent. It was the Second World 
War that finally convinced several governments of the need to create a united 
Europe.4 
Not only is there a clear parallel to be found between the devastation of 
war leading to reactions of international cooperation,5 the reverse is also true. 
Strained interstate economic conditions prior to both World Wars have contrib-
uted to their eruption.6 
As Cass states: ‘(...) interstate trade has been, if not synonymous, then 
closely associated, with the course of war and peace, and the construction of 
international order. This coincidence is not surprising. International order has 
long been bound up with the practice of institutions and ideas about democ-
racy and individual freedom, and in many cases trade has been the key vehi-
cle for these changes.’7 
Similar methods, different levels 
The underlying rationale of both international agreements is also apparent 
from the adopted method, preventing protectionism through the liberalization 
of international trade. Comparing the EU and WTO preambles demonstrates 
that the ultimate aim is to reduce barriers to trade in order to reach a level 
playing field for national and international competitors, as well as for interna-
tional competitors.8 
Besides rhetoric included in the preambles, the central provisions ensuring 
the abolishment or reduction of barriers to trade contain this ‘level playing 
field’ idea. The central WTO law concept of national treatment indicates that, 
                                         
3  Jackson 1998, p. 15; Lowenfeld 2002, p. 502; Cass 2005, p. 9. 
4  Chalmers et al 2006, p. 7; Foster 2006, p. 6-7. 
5  Prime examples are the League of Nations after the First World War and the United 
Nations after the Second World War. 
6  Cass 2005, p 7, referring to: N. Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: Penguin 1998). 
7  Cass 2005, p 5; similarly: Jackson 1998, p. 2. 
8  The EU aims at the establishment of an internal market where the factors of production 
can freely cross borders and where competition is not distorted, article 3 EC. The pre-
amble of the WTO Agreement indicates the aim of: ‘substantial reduction of tariffs and 
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international 
trade relations.’ 
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once products or services are allowed access to a certain market,9 they must be 
treated similar as domestic products or services, otherwise discriminatory 
treatment undermines the market access concessions which result from the nego-
tiation process.10 Similarly, the EU provisions provide the right to pursue eco-
nomic activities in another Member State ‘under the same conditions as are im-
posed by that State on its own nationals.’11 
Whatever the current status in aspiring towards this historical aim, it is im-
portant to keep this notion of a level playing field in mind as it is directly de-
rived from the above described nexus between economic discrimination (either 
protectionism or differential treatment between foreign traders) and deteriora-
tion of international relations. This aim lies at the heart of both international 
legal orders. 
A level playing field in service provision 
Both legal orders include international trade in services. The original European 
Economic Community treaty provided free movement of services12 from its in-
ception, and the expansion of the GATT trading regime through the WTO 
Agreement saw the creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). 
While modern communication technologies allow for international trade in 
service in the ‘classical’ cross-border sense, many services still require proximity 
between supplier and producer.13 Therefore, any international framework 
                                         
9  Contrary to the EU internal market, which (at least legally) already provides full market 
access for the factors of production, WTO market access is achieved progressively, 
trade in goods through negotiations on the reduction of tariffs and trade in services 
through the negotiation of market access commitments, article II GATT, article XVI GATS. 
Equality for competing foreign service providers is ensured by GATS article II containing 
the Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN). 
10  Article II GATT, article XVII GATS. See for this argument in relation to national treatment 
relating to trade in goods: Matsushita, Schoenbaum & Mavroidis 2006, p. 234. 
11  Article 49 EC; The provisions establishing the EU internal market are defined as non-
discrimination principles, see for an example relevant to the topic at hand: C-113/89 
Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, par 11. Several cases indicate that non-discrimina-
tion is no longer the leading principle, a mere barrier to trade is sufficient to trigger ap-
plication of the EU Treaty, for example: case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR 
I-4221, par 12; see for an explanation: Barnard 2004, p. 273-276. 
12  The term free movement of services is derived from EU law which ensures the so-called 
‘four freedoms’. The four freedoms indicate the liberalization of goods, services, labour 
and capital. 
13  Services often cannot be controlled at the border or would require a costly and burden-
some policing system, Matsushita, Schoenbaum & Mavroidis 2006, p. 604-605. The in-
visible character of services, the intangible and personal nature and the requirement of 
proximity between supplier and consumer are often cited as explanations for the diffi-
→ 
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dealing with trade in services will have to incorporate ways to accommodate 
movement of either supplier or consumer across borders.14 However, this form 
of service provision is no longer confined to the realm of trade law. Interna-
tional trade now enters the domains of immigration policies and domestic la-
bour market policies, two subjects that states traditionally are reluctant to yield 
to international binding agreements.15 
2. Comparison EU and WTO law on posted workers 
The rights derived from the EU internal market relating to the free movement of 
persons are to some extent available for nationals of non-EU Member States 
(third country nationals).16 Besides movement rights for long term residents17 the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has established the right for businesses to move 
with their own labour force, including third country nationals, to another Mem-
ber State in order to provide services.18 In order to utilize their economic right 
to provide services, employers must be allowed to post their employees on the 
territory of the Member State where they provide their service, under certain 
conditions. 
It is important to realize that this right is derived from a business’s right to 
provide services and thus should not be seen as establishing free movement of 
labour rights for third country nationals.19 The rationale that led the Court to 
this decision is that, in order to compete under the same conditions as imposed 
on national service providers, foreign (EU established) service providers must 
be allowed to move freely to another Member State including its staff.  This 
entails that making the movement of staff subject to restrictions such as condi-
tions as to engagement in situ or an obligation to obtain a work permit, would 
discriminate against the foreign service supplier as its competitors in the host 
country are able to use their own staff without restrictions.20 In other words, 
such conditions distort the aim of a level playing field. 
                                         
culty of controlling trade in services through border measures. See: Levitt 1983, p. 92-
102; Bhagwati 1984, p. 135-136; Karsenty 2000, p. 35-36. 
14  Bast 2008, p. 574-575. 
15  Bast 2008, p. 575. 
16  In this paper the term Member States will be reserved for the EU Member States, in con-
trast to the term WTO Members. 
17  Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents. 
18  This right was first established in the cases C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-
1417 and C-43/93 Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803. 
19  Similarly, the GATS does not affect measures regulating access to the employment mar-
ket, GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agree-
ment, article 2. 
20  Rush Portuguesa, par. 11-12. 
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An identical source for temporary migration rights is found in the GATS. Ar-
ticle II of the GATS divides trade in services into four modes of supply. The 
GATS not only applies to cross-border trade in services (mode 1) but also to 
forms of trade where consumers move abroad (mode 2); where providers 
make use of a commercial presence abroad (mode 3); and where natural per-
sons move across borders to provide services (mode 4). Mode 4 services provi-
sion is defined as the temporary movement of either self-employed service 
providers, or employees of a service provider, providing a service to a con-
sumer on the territory of another WTO Member.21 It is this second part of the 
definition which is similar to the EU extension of the freedom to provide services 
to include movement rights for third country personnel.22 
Based on the reaction of Member States to the ECJ case law on the posting 
of third country national employees, Guild demonstrates a tension between the 
movement of persons for service provision and national law and policy on eco-
nomic immigration.23 In a series of cases, the European Commission has com-
menced proceedings against several Member States for violations of the free 
movement of services through immigration and employment policy legislation. 
While the EU obligations are forced upon the Member States through ECJ 
case law, the Dutch government has freely committed itself to several obliga-
tions regarding temporary labour migration through the GATS.24 
Dutch law concerning the posting of workers 
The Aliens Act (AA, Vreemdelingenwet 2000)25 regulates the right of foreign 
nationals to enter and reside in the Netherlands. Employers of posted workers 
                                         
21  GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement. 
Consumption abroad and commercial presence can involve movement of consumers, re-
spectively personnel of corporations, across borders. This paper will focus on the move-
ment of posted workers only. However, as noted by Guild and Barth, mode 2 does not 
seem to involve the right of consumers to move across borders. Similarly, the original EU 
provision establishing freedom of service provision was limited to provision of services. 
However, the ECJ ruled that freedom of service provision applied equally to the recipi-
ent of services, case 286/82 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377; Guild & Barth 1999, 
p. 398. 
22  Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, article 
1. 
23  Guild 2008, p. 1-8. 
24  That these EU obligations are forced upon the Member States is evident from several 
procedures in which the ECJ has declared national law incompatible with the freedom to 
provide services, some of which will be described below. 
25  See regarding the official translations from Dutch: Dutch Ministry of Justice, in coopera-
tion with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Agency for the Reception of 
Asylum Seekers and the Royal Military Constabulary, Begrippenlijst Vreemdelingenbeleid, 
p. 46-63. 
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performing labour on Dutch territory have to comply with the Aliens Employ-
ment Act (AEA, Wet arbeid vreemdelingen).26 
The Aliens Act and the Aliens Decree clarify the relationship between resi-
dence permits and employment licenses. The Aliens Act requires the relevant 
authority, the Immigration and Nationalization Service (Immigratie en Naturali-
satie Dienst), to provide labour migrants with a residence permit if a work per-
mit had been granted. The duration of the residence permit is linked to the du-
ration of the employment license. Foreigners who have the right to work in the 
Netherlands can only be refused a residence permit if the foreigner is a threat 
to the public order.27 
Access to the labour market for foreigners in general is based on a work 
permit system directed at employers. The central provision of the Aliens Em-
ployment Act prohibits employers to let a foreigner supply labour in the Neth-
erlands without a work permit.28 Regarding temporary labour, as per defini-
tion is the case with posted employees of service providers, several conditions 
certify that admitting foreigners to perform temporary labour does not lead to 
a longer stay. Moreover, after the temporary labour has ended, employees 
have to stay abroad for a certain amount of time before they can be the sub-
ject of a new work permit.29 
The application for a work permit must be submitted by employers.30 The 
Aliens Employment Act provides several imperative refusal grounds and discre-
tionary refusal grounds which therefore form the conditions under which for-
eigners may perform labour in the Netherlands. 
Refusal grounds 
Article 8 Aliens Employment Act contains several imperative refusal grounds. 
The most important ground for refusal is availability of priority enjoying la-
bour. In GATS terminology this would be referred to as an economic needs 
test.31 The term priority enjoying labour relates to inter alia citizens of states 
that enjoy free movement rights in the European Union and EU citizens. Thus, if 
the specific labour required by the employer requesting a work permit for a 
foreigner can be fulfilled by priority enjoying labour, the application must be 
                                         
26  Note that several specific regimes, which will not be described in this paper, deviate 
from these rules, for instance the rules applying to high skilled workers. 
27  Article 3.31, par. 1 Aliens Decree (AD, Vreemdelingen besluit 2000). The relevant tempo-
rary residence permit is provided on the basis of article 14 Aliens Act; see also: De 
Lange 2007, p. 270. 
28  Article 2, par. 1 AEA. 
29  Article 11, par. 1 and 3 AEA; Van Drongelen, Van den Bogaard & Van Rijs 2005, p. 50. 
30  Article 6, par 1 AEA. 
31  See: article XVI GATS. 
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refused.32 A work permit can also be granted under certain conditions which 
require an employer to increase efforts to rely on priority enjoying labour re-
garding future applications. 
Other imperative refusal grounds are inter alia: 
-  The job position was not notified five weeks prior to the submission of a re-
quest for a work permit relating to a foreign national. Coupled with the 
period of five weeks in which the relevant authorities decide upon the re-
quest, the total duration of a work permit application can take up to ten 
weeks.33 
-  The foreigner is admitted for the first time but does not earn, during the 
period of a month, at least the minimum wage. 
-  The labour does not serve the Dutch interest. 
 
The five weeks notice of the job position serves the purpose of providing time 
to make sure that available priority enjoying labour fulfils the position. As the 
authorities have five weeks to decide whether to grant or refuse a work permit, 
the total duration of a work permit application can take up to ten weeks.34 
The minimum wage requirement serves two purposes. In the first place, it 
prevents that a residence permit is rejected on the basis of insufficient fund 
while an employment permit is granted. Secondly, the minimum wage require-
ment should be seen as expressing the requirement that foreigners must con-
tribute to the Dutch economy in order to pass the restrictive migration rules.35 
Besides the imperative refusal grounds, article 9 Aliens Employment Act 
contains a wide range of optional refusal grounds. Several of these grounds 
relate to an employer’s efforts to ensure that priority enjoying labour fulfils the 
labour in question.36 
As is apparent, competing foreign service providers are at a severe disad-
vantage. The process of obtaining a work permit alone can take up to ten 
weeks, and only when priority enjoying labour is not available can a business 
utilize its regular staff. Regardless all the other conditions, it is already appar-
ent that service contracts requiring fast action will be difficult to obtain by for-
eign companies.37 
                                         
32  Article 1 AEA in conjunction with articles 3, par. 1(a) and 4, par. 1 AEA. See in particular: 
Van Drongelen, Van den Bogaard & Van Rijs 2005, p. 126-127. 
33  Article 6, par 2 AEA; Van Drongelen, Van den Bogaard & Van Rijs 2005, p. 41. 
34  See also article 6, par. 2 AEA. 
35  Van Drongelen, Van den Bogaard & Van Rijs 2005, p. 41-42. 
36  Article 9 AEA, see in general: Van Drongelen, Van den Bogaard & Van Rijs 2005, p. 44-
46. 
37  Note that this regime says nothing regarding actual access to the market for the business 
itself, that topic is not addressed in this paper. 
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The implementation of GATS obligations in Dutch law concerning the 
posting of workers 
The change derived from the GATS on the above described legal system con-
cerning posted workers, is limited to the abolishment of the priority enjoying 
labour test (or economic needs test). This conditions is not required when a busi-
ness posts its employees in the Netherlands to provide a service if the service 
provision falls within the scope of the GATS agreement. As the requirement of 
a five weeks notice for the job application is related to priority enjoying la-
bour having the chance to fulfil the application, this requirement is not applied 
as well. 
The removal of the requirement to utilize priority enjoying labour is signifi-
cant as this forms a serious impediment on the notion of a level playing field as 
described above. Yet clearly the abolishment of this test is only the beginning 
towards this aim, as all other requirements described above, still apply. More-
over, the GATS regime applies under the following severely restrictive condi-
tions:38 
-  Service provision does not exceed three months and the service contract 
was established in accordance with relevant Dutch or EU public tender 
rules. 
-  The posted workers are part of the regular staff of the service provider 
and have been employed over a year in relation to the services to be pro-
vided. 
-  Residence in the Netherlands is limited to three months within a two year 
period. 
-  Posted employees may only provide labour in relation to the service to be 
provided and the number of posted employees may not exceed that which 
is reasonably required in order to provide the service. 
-  The type of service provision is limited to the following sectors: accountan-
cy, taxation advisory services, architectural services, engineering services, 
integrated engineering services, urban planning and landscape architec-
tural services, computer and related services, construction services. 
-  Posted workers require a university degree, three years of relevant work 
experience and should comply with relevant Dutch requirements relating to 
the profession concerned. 
 
It seems safe to presume that the requirement of labour serving the Dutch inter-
est should be considered fulfilled under these circumstances. As this category of 
                                         
38  Delegation and Implementation Decree Aliens Employment Acts (Delegatie en Uitvoe-
ringsbesluit Wav), article 8, par 18 under b. 
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GATS service provision is limited to a specific list of service sectors, the Dutch 
government clearly intended to allow service provision in these sectors. In any 
case, the Dutch horizontal commitment on mode 4 service provision would be 
violated if the Dutch authorities would refuse the granting of a work permit to 
a posted worker in one of these sectors on the condition that the Dutch interest 
is not served.39 
Finally, it is important to note that the GATS does not affect a WTO Mem-
ber’s right to maintain visa requirements, as long as that requirement does not 
nullify or impair the granted movement rights for natural persons. As such, the 
EU visa rules can still be applied.40 
EU case law concerning the posting of workers 
As indicated above, the regime applying to posted employees of EU based 
businesses is quite different. The perceived tension between temporary service 
provision and national labour market policies is apparent from various ECJ 
cases where measures affecting the rights of businesses to post their staff in a 
Member State were at stake.41 The following measures are examples of meas-
ures used to control such movement in cases where the employee concerned is a 
third country national.42 
-  Requirement of a work permit, or a specific posting visa to be obtained 
prior to arrival (ensuring job priority for EU national workers, compliance 
with social welfare rules, minimum wages, working conditions and the dura-
tion of contracts). 
-  Employment contract conditions, indefinite duration and in existence for 
certain amount of time before the employees are posted (necessary to 
protect the labour market by ensuring that the employee has lawful and 
regular employment and a stable link with the Member State of origin and 
the company reducing risks of exploitation, needed to avoid social dump-
ing and to ensure return of the employee). 
-  Requirement of a residence permit (needed to control the movement of 
aliens). 
-  Passport valid for period of residence. 
                                         
39  The EU and Dutch GATS schedules of commitments are described below. 
40  GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, 
article 4, fn 13; Council Regulation 539/2001 of 15 March 2001, listing the third coun-
tries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders 
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ L 81 2001, p. 1. 
41  Several of these cases are addressed in: Tans 2008. 
42  Case C-445/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2004] ECR I-10191; case C-244/04 Com-
mission v Germany [2006] ECR I-885; case C-168/04 Commission v Austria [2006] ECR I-
9041; summarized in: Guild 2008, p. 5-7. 
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-  Information concerning the dates of beginning and ending of the posting, 
information concerning the business, its clients, identities of employees and 
remuneration. 
-  Evidence that wage and employment conditions, social security provision 
and affiliation to social security schemes covering sickness and accidents 
are met for duration of posting (preventing social dumping). 
-  Bank guarantees to cover the cost of repatriation at the end of the contract 
(providing security for employees). 
 
As indicated by Guild, the motivations for such measures roughly fit into two 
categories: 
-  The risk of abuse of service provision to gain access to the labour market 
for third country nationals. 
-  The risk of exploitation of the employees who are posted.43 
 
While the ECJ recognized the validity of the objectives concerned, it ruled that 
none of these measures were proportionate to the aim they sought to ensure. In 
particular the ECJ indicated that concerns regarding the enforcement of labour 
protection rules could be met by requiring simple declarations from the em-
ployer. Similar, the conditions attached to the employment contract were found 
to be excessive for the protection of social welfare. In particularly, this is an 
obstacle for sectors where services to be provided necessitate a certain speed 
of action.44 
As was the case in the original Rush Portuguesa and Vander Elst judgments, 
the Court stressed that posted employees do not gain access to the labour 
market of the host state as they return to the country of origin when the service 
provision is completed. While legitimate control to prevent entry to the national 
labour market is allowed, this control should not render illusory the right to pro-
vide services which may not be made subject to the discretion of national au-
thorities.45 
The outcome of these cases is reflected in Dutch law as the above de-
scribed rules do not apply. A notification requirement applies when businesses 
established within the EU post their third country national employees to provide 
a service in the Netherlands.46 Notification should be prior to the posting and 
                                         
43  Guild 2008, p. 8. Immigration concerns could be added as well, however these in part 
relate to the same concerns, insofar as they do not address national security. 
44  Commission v Germany, par. 35. 
45  Commission v Luxembourg, par. 38. 
46  Section 1e Decree implementing the Aliens Employment Act.  See for an overview (in 
Dutch) the website of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment <www.szw.nl>. 
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provide reliable information regarding the business, the provided service and 
the identity of the employee.47 Along the lines of the ECJ case law, this regime 
only applies to third country nations legally employed and residing in the 
Member State where the service provider is established. Businesses engaged in 
the making available of labour are exempted and thus fall within the regime 
for employers’ not enjoying EU free movement of services rights.48 
While the mere requirement of a declaration is in line with the above de-
scribed ECJ case law, the European Commission has threatened the Dutch au-
thorities with an infringement procedure as failing to oblige with this notifica-
tion requirement can lead to significant fines.49 Again, the idea is that foreign 
service providers are at a disadvantage compared to domestic service provid-
ers. The risk of a substantive fine if the notification does not comply with the 
national rules forms a disincentive to post foreign workers in the Netherlands. 
The Dutch legal regime applying to posted workers of non-EU based busi-
nesses shows an interesting parallel with the measures deemed disproportion-
ate by the ECJ. As indicated by Guild, the EU Member States have difficulties 
in accepting the idea that the extension of a businesses right to provide ser-
vices, allowing its employees to fulfil the service contract, is not similar to pro-
viding access to the labour market.50 The rationale underpinning the two inter-
national legal orders aim for service liberalization is similar, the creation of 
equal conditions for competing foreign and national service providers. It should 
again be stressed that the WTO legal order has by no means arrived at the 
same level of liberalization. Nevertheless, the idea expressed here is that this is 
the ultimate aim. 
In the next paragraph, this paper will examine the WTO method striving 
towards this aim, the principle of progressive liberalization through negotia-
tions. As will be demonstrated, there is a clear difference between the ex-
pressed ambitions regarding services in general and temporary service migra-
tion in particular and the actual level of trade liberalization reached and cur-
rently offered in the WTO negotiations. 
Surely this difference is related to WTO mechanism, the level of liberaliza-
tion is to be raised through progressive liberalization; thus more commitments 
are required. As indicated before, the process towards the level playing field 
in service provision is incomparable. However, WTO Members are currently 
                                         
47  A questionnaire concerning the required information is available through the website of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment: <www.szw.nl>. 
48  This category of service providers was exempted from the Rush Portuguesa decision, Rush 
Portuguesa, par. 16. 
49  De Heer et al 2008, p. 151. 
50  Guild 2008, p. 1. 
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involved in the Doha Round negotiations aimed at additional commitments. 
Moreover, developing countries are providing pressure on developed countries 
to open up their services markets in the area of mode 4. Nevertheless, studying 
the EU’s (and other WTO Member’s) existing mode 4 commitment and the cur-
rent offer in the Doha round demonstrates that progress in the WTO area cur-
rently is so modest that it becomes questionable whether the mentioned aim is 
actually sought. An examination of the rationale for this reluctance is provided 
below. 
4. WTO service liberalization 
Over the last three decades the growth in services trade, under the influence of 
globalization and new technological possibilities, has been spectacular. It had 
taken until the 1980’s before trade economist started to show interest in ser-
vices and before that time, services were mostly considered non-tradable.51 
Nevertheless, in 2002 services was calculated to account for 72 percent of 
Global Domestic Product (GDP) in developed countries and 49 percent in de-
veloping countries.52 In 2005 the services sector accounted for 2.4 trillion of the 
total 12.5 trillion in world exports, turning services exports into the fastest 
growing sector of trade exports.53 In 2005 Foreign Direct Investment in services 
had surpassed that in manufacturing.54 
Moreover, gains from services liberalization are expected to provide high-
er gains than liberalization in goods. Protection levels are currently higher re-
garding trade in services which suggests more potential for gains.55 Additional-
ly, services play a significant role in the economy56 and liberalization relating 
to intermediate services leads to positive effects for downstream manufacturing 
industries.57 Services play an important role in human societies and human de-
                                         
51  Note that this applies to trade economists; services had certainly not escaped the interest 
of economists in general. Services have, for example, interested classical economists such 
as Smith and Marx as opposed to goods in attempting to define productive labour, and 
economists interested in the idea of services undermining jobs by replacing labour 
through technological change, see for a brief summary: Bhagwati 1984, p. 133. For an 
account of the placing of services trade on the international trade agenda see: Drake 
and Nicolaïdis 1992, p. 45-53; see also Sapir 1999, p. 52. 
52  UNCTAD 2002. 
53  WTO Annual Statistical Report 2006, p. 3; Fernandes 2008, p. 105. 
54  OECD 2005, p. 60. 
55  Delimatsis 2006, p. 1059-1060. 
56  See for an account on the significance of services in lower and higher developed econo-
mies, Fernandes 2008, p. 107-108. 
57  Examples of service sectors in which spill over effects can be significant are transport, 
banking and insurances, IT services, advertising and wholesale and retail trading. See 
→ 
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velopment as well. Affordable education, water, health and electricity and uni-
versal access are crucial factors for equal development in societies.58 
The enthusiasm surrounding potential trade in services through liberalization 
is strongly expressed regarding liberalization of trade in services based on 
mode 4. Estimations of economic growth that could stem from liberalization in 
mode 4 vary considerably, yet estimations are high indeed. Appave indicates 
that a yearly growth of 150 to 350 billion dollar in global gross domestic 
product (GDP) is possible, based on a modest form of liberalization in mode 
4.59 While in 2005 trade in services based on the movement of natural persons 
was estimated at a mere one to two percent of total trade in services com-
pared to the other three GATS modes, this also means that there is a huge po-
tential for growth.60 Whalmsley and Winters estimate that when developed 
countries would allow entry of migrants equal to 3% of the current work popu-
lation a growth of 150 billion dollar in global GDP could be achieved.61 
The total number of migrants in 2005 was estimated at 185 to 190 million 
migrants of which some 85 to 95 million participate in the labour market in the 
host country.62 It is difficult to derive the impact of mode 4 on these migration 
flows as some countries do not calculate temporary workers when the duration 
of their stay is short. Moreover, migration statistics are not intended to calculate 
mode 4 movements as it does not fall within standard migration regulation 
schemes. Calculating the amount of people that provide a service abroad 
based on mode 4 is therefore difficult.63 However, it goes without saying that 
an increase in mode 4 trade would lead to an increase in temporary migration. 
Contrasting rhetoric 
These estimations are part of a broader trend. Many publications (in particular 
those from international organizations) emphasize that migration should be 
                                         
for an interesting account on the effect barriers to trade in services have on manufactur-
ing, Langhammer 2007. See also Fernandes 2008, p. 108-109. 
58  Fernandes 2008, p 109. Note that critique surrounds the idea of liberalizing these ser-
vice sectors, see for example: Woodroffe 2001, p. 34-35; Barlow 2001, p. 112-119. 
59  Appave 2005, p. 27; Martin 2006, p. v, who provides a critical perspective on these 
predicted gains. 
60  WTO Annual Statistical Report 2005, p. 8; Winters 2003, p. 3. One should be cautious 
when using such figures as reliable and comparable data relating to mode 4 trade flows 
is lacking, WTO World Trade Report 2004 Exploring the Linkage between the Domestic 
Policy Environment and International Trade (Geneva: WTO 2004), p. 57.  Nevertheless, it 
is safe to presume that current trade related to GATS mode 4 is still insignificant com-
pared to other modes of supply. 
61  Walmsley & Winters 2005. 
62  Appave 2005, p. 28; Martin 2006, p. v; Chetail 2008, p. 184. 
63  Appave 2005, p. 28; UN Millennium Project 2005, p. 88. 
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seen as an opportunity for development, a message also expressed by the 
European Union.64 As the estimated gains would benefit both developed and 
developing countries, temporary labour migration is often heralded as a rem-
edy for poverty as well as a solution for shortages in work populations in de-
veloped countries.65 Moreover, the Doha Round agenda is specifically aimed 
at supporting developing WTO Members, hence the frequent referral to the 
Doha Development Round.66 
The positive rhetoric derived from this ‘migration-development nexus’67 
could fit in a broader EU policy objective. During and after the Uruguay 
Round, the EU strongly pushed for liberalization of services and the develop-
ment of the GATS.68 As noted by Guild and Barth, during the 1990’s the EU 
saw trade in services for the developed European economies as the solution for 
the loss of manufacturing industries to developing countries.69 During the Lisbon 
summit, held in March 2000, the European Union Council expressed the inten-
tion to make the EU the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based econ-
omy in the world by 2010. 
Nevertheless, a dichotomy can be perceived within EU policies concerning 
the focus on trade in services and the restrictive external border policy.70 As 
                                         
64  See for instance: IOM 2005, p. 9; UN 2004, p. 127; ILO 2004, par. 432; Council of the 
European Union, Joint Statement by the Council and the representatives of the Govern-
ments of the Member States meeting with the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission on European Union Development Policy: The European Consensus, 22 No-
vember 2005, Doc. 14820/05, par. 38. 
As noted by Chetail, the idea that migration could provide a solution to poverty indi-
cates a modest shift in thinking by States and international organizations. The root causes 
approach to migration (migration is caused by a failure of development in the home 
state) is now flanked by more positive notions linking temporary migration with benefits 
for home and host country, Chetail 2008, p. 199-200. 
65  UN 2004, p 127. 
66  Defining services has been a topic of considerable debate within the Group of Negotiat-
ing on Services. Defining services touches the blurry and politically sensitive lines be-
tween trade in services on the one hand, and immigration or foreign direct investment on 
the other. Developed countries sought the inclusion of meaningful portfolio investment. 
This provided an opening for developing countries which were keen on including labour 
flows into the GATS framework. The result was the inclusion of both capital and labour, 
be it restricted to a temporary duration and a specific purpose, Drake & Nicolaidis 
1992, p. 72-73; Lang 2009, p. 161. However, as is evident from the schedules of com-
mitments, mode 3 has received far more attention than mode 4. 
67  Chetail 2008, p. 184. 
68  The development of the negotiating position of the European Community during the Uru-
guay round is thoroughly described in Drake & Nicolaïdis 1992, see in particular: p. 77-
80; Guild & Barth 1999, p. 397. 
69  Guild & Barth 1999, p. 397. 
70  See for an interesting account dealing with this dichotomy, Chetail 2008. 
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such this positive rhetoric is not reflected in the current GATS mode 4 commit-
ments or in the current offers in the WTO Doha Round negotiations.71  
Current mode 4 commitments 
The market access and national treatment obligations form the heart of GATS 
liberalization. However, these provisions are not general obligations. A Mem-
ber specifically adopts commitments which indicate the service sectors and 
modes of supply to which these obligations apply, the so called positive listing 
approach. These commitments can be seen as Member’s contractual promises to 
open their services markets to foreign trade. Note that limitations to commit-
ments follow a negative listing approach, if a Member wants to exclude certain 
measures from these obligations this must be explicitly indicated in their sched-
ules. 
Mode 4 liberalization is generally limited to a level below existing tempo-
rary labour schemes, as is apparent from several studies analyzing existing 
commitments negotiated and scheduled during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions.72 The modest liberalization achieved during the Uruguay Round can be 
explained by the fact that negotiations focused first on the question whether 
services should be included in the multilateral trading system, and then on the 
drafting of the GATS itself. As the Uruguay Round negotiations had to be con-
cluded by the end of 1993, there was little time left for negotiating commit-
ments.73 
Future commitments, the Doha Round 
The GATS approach aims at a progressively higher level of liberalization 
through effective market access.74 As such, article XIX GATS commits Members 
to enter into successive rounds of liberalization negotiations, to commence no 
later than five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
Currently, these negotiations take place within the Doha Round. The Doha ne-
gotiations are different in substance and nature when compared to the Uru-
                                         
71  Carzaniga 2003, p 24; Adlung & Roy 2005, p 1171-1172. When studying the sched-
ules of commitments it is crucial to realize that the normal negative list approach towards 
scheduling limitations has been reversed for mode 4. Thus the few commitments that have 
been made are usually severely limited. 
72  Examples of such studies are: Altinger & Enders 1996; Adlung & Roy 2005. See also: 
Chaudhuri, Mattoo & Self 2004; Leal-Arcas 2008, p. 19. 
73  The services negotiations suffered from opposition by developing countries to the inclu-
sion of services in the negotiating round and the novelty and technical complexity of the 
subject, Adlung & Roy 2005, p. 1163. 
74  Article XIX:1 GATS. 
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guay Round. The aim of the Doha Round is to extend liberalization and com-
plement the GATS rules where the Uruguay Round left them incomplete.75 
However, so far little progress was achieved. The latest failed attempt at a 
successful conclusion of the Doha Round was in June 2008.76 Studying the cur-
rent offers, in particular the EU’s offer regarding mode 4 reveals little progres-
sion. It is important to note that offers during a negotiating round do not bind 
WTO members, thus until the round is completed, changes might occur.77 
Besides five (three groups and two individual Member States) extremely 
confusing differentiations in the definition of intra-corporate transfers (relating 
to the question where the commercial presence, wishing to transfer one of its 
employees, is established), the EU offer notably now includes graduate train-
ees as a new group of intra-corporate transfers.78 Furthermore, an entirely new 
category of contractual service suppliers, independent professionals, is included 
allowing access to seven service sectors, be it under several limitations.79 
Regarding the posting of employees by contractual service suppliers, the 
service sectors where contractual service suppliers and their personnel are now 
welcome (though the severe limitations remain similar) are extended with the 
following sectors:80 
-  Bookkeeping services. 
-  Related scientific and technical consulting services (relating to technical test-
ing and analysis services). 
-  Maintenance and repair of equipment in the context of an after-sales or 
after-lease services contract. 
-  Environmental services. 
                                         
75  Leal-Arcas 2008, p. 10-11. 
76  The 2008 Geneva mini-Ministerial began on 21 July and ended unsuccessful in a col-
lapse on 29 July. See: Bridges Daily Update WTO Mini-Ministerial, Geneva, issues 1-10, 
July 2008 available online through the ICTSD website <www.ictsd.net>. 
77  See: WTO (TNC) 2008, par. 4; Persin notes that the EU offer on mode 4 is more gener-
ous than those of other WTO Members, Persin 2008, p. 840, fn 2. Speculating, in the 
light of offers from other developed countries, the EU might backtrack on its current of-
fer. 
78  Other minor, and from a terminology perspective positive changes are renaming intra-
corporate transferees to intra-corporate transfers and the inclusion of the titles ‘manag-
ers’ and ‘specialists’ as common nominators for the old two categories of intra-corporate 
transferees i(a) and i(b). 
79  WTO (CTS) 2005 Conditional Revised Offer EU Horizontal Section. 
80  WTO (CTS) 2005 Conditional Revised Offer EU Horizontal Section. 
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5. Reluctance relating to service migration 
Several attempts have been made to indicate the reasons why results so far 
have been limited.81 Besides the above explained lack of time during the Uru-
guay Round, scheduling under the current level of unilateral liberalization 
leaves room to maneuver in the WTO negotiation process. The difference be-
tween commitment and the current level of openness in services sectors can be 
used as bargaining material when requesting commitments from other Mem-
bers. 
A thorough overview is provided by Adlung and Roy who list several fac-
tors possibly providing disincentives to negotiate and schedule commitments: 
-  Services commitments may incur more costs and time to be implemented as 
they can require changes in regulations and the creation of administrative 
bodies. 
-  Various governmental departments may share competences required to 
liberalize trade in services, leading to coordination problems. 
-  A lack of information and commercial interest: national positions in trade 
negotiations tend to reflect internal balance of country in protection seek-
ing and liberalizing interests. Producers are usually better organized than 
consumers, thus they tend to carry more political weight. Border protection 
and high costs of basic consumer needs (food) provide a good example as 
even a tariff equivalent of several hundred percent in OECD countries does 
not lead to resistance. Education and basic health are very different due to 
social policy which drives a wig between supply and demand. This leads to 
an even lower incentive for consumers to press for efficient resource use. 
On the other hand, providers usually denounce competition as a threat to 
those basic policy objectives. 
-  The GATS might be too complicated, thus basic information concerning the 
benefits of liberalization might be missing. This lack of support from export 
industries leaves only the protectionist voice; 
-  Specifically regarding mode 4, restrictions are easy to enforce due to strict 
immigration controls. Regarding mode 4 there is continuing heavy re-
sistance.82 
                                         
81  Roy provides an analysis of possible motivations for governments to undertake different 
levels of market access commitments under the GATS. He suggests four key determinants: 
democracy (democratic states realize legal implications and value locking-in effect of 
commitments), relative power (powerful states undertake more commitments), relative 
abundance in human capital (providing a comparative advantage in services) and the 
negotiating process (WTO Members that joined later have undertaken more services 
commitments), Roy 2009, p. 2. 
82  Adlung & Roy 2005, p. 1165-1167. 
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This last argument is interesting regarding the topic at hand. In general, and 
particularly regarding temporary service migration rights, adopting a more 
liberal access scheme is different from binding that scheme in a commitment. 
When economic conditions change a state has the option to re-instate re-
strictions. This option is no longer available after binding the current measures 
or policy by inscribing them in the schedules of commitments.83 
Yet, as is evident from the above described reluctance to abolish measures 
deemed contrary to the EU freedom to provide services, the heart of resistance 
regarding mode 4 liberalization is likely the sensitivity of this form of trade 
liberalization. This sensitivity is derived from the proximity to labour migration 
policies and immigration policies. This is also evident from the rather apparent 
denial of this proximity when mode 4 is discussed. As such, the GATS specifi-
cally indicates that mode 4 concerns temporary service provision and not the 
liberalization of labour.84 As quoted by Persin: ‘even though Mode 4 is not a 
migration category or concept, it is in practice regulated by migration policies 
including visa requirements’.85 
Social dumping and labour market protection 
The concept of social dumping can be explained as follows. Developed coun-
tries argue that the liberalization of international trade, in some way has to be 
connected to labour law. The argument is based on the thought that weak la-
bour law regulation leads to a competitive advantage in relation to countries 
with a higher level protection. Low wage countries claim the opposite, a con-
nection between liberalization of trade flows from protectionism and would 
negate a legitimate comparative advantage.86 
From a services perspective social dumping has a different form.87 Through 
liberalization low wage workers become available in countries where before 
liberalization companies could only use expensive domestic workers. This ap-
                                         
83  UN Millennium Project 2005, p. 87. While it is possible to withdraw commitments, the 
GATS rules prescribe that a compensating commitment needs to be negotiated, see: 
GATS article XXI. Persin provides an interesting study based on the United Kingdom’s re-
luctance to increase its mode 4 commitments, while it did allow movement of labour from 
the new EU Member States before this was obligatory. Her main conclusion relates to the 
argument that mode 4 commitments are binding, thus lacking flexibility required in la-
bour market policies, Persin 2008. 
84  See in particular: Persin 2008, p. 841 referring to the Global Commission on Interna-
tional migration 2005, p. 19. 
85  Persin 2008, p. 841. 
86  Servais 1989, p. 423; Langille 1997, p. 29-31; Florkowski 2006, p. 54. Many develop-
ing countries under scribe this viewpoint, for instance the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and India, see: Mah 1998, p 292-302, p. 292. 
87  See for instance Verschueren 2006, p. 403-449, p. 404. 
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plies to local companies as well as to companies established abroad operating 
within the country through the posting of personnel.88 
The idea is that migrants are willing to work for lower wages and under 
worse circumstances than local employees. Attracting personnel from abroad 
influences the local level of wages even if wage parity is ensured. Normally, a 
shortage in personnel will lead to an increase in the level of wages. However, 
the possibility to employ foreign workers will disrupt this process.89 Possibilities 
to employing workers from abroad could also lead to job loss for local work-
ers. From a human rights perspective an opposite fear is expressed, providing 
foreign workers with a lower wage violates the principle of non-discrimina-
tion.90 
Consequently, fear over migrants unfairly competing with domestic work-
ers, and fear regarding job loss in general have lead to the adoption of re-
strictive migration policies in an attempt to protect domestic labour markets.91 It 
is interesting to point to the aims of the above described Dutch legislation con-
cerning the employment of aliens which contain inter alia a restrictive policy of 
access for labour migrants and combating illegal labour.92 
Whether these fears over mode 4 trade liberalization are justified de-
pends on the conditions that apply to the commitments. Countries can simply 
inscribe mode 4 commitments with the condition that service providers from 
abroad have to be paid a minimum wage or at wage parity. The application 
of national labour standards regulation can be ensured in this manner as well. 
Most WTO Members that have adopted mode 4 concessions, including the EU, 
have included language to ensure wage parity and equal working conditions 
for GATS migrants.93 
                                         
88  Gray 2005, p. 13. 
89  Martin 2006, p. 7 and 12. 
90  Trebilcock and Howse argue that fear of job loss and pressure on social security is un-
warranted, except regarding job loss for the lowest wage jobs, as long as migration is 
guided orderly, Trebilcock & Howse 2005, p. 614-615. Martin is far more critical, re-
garding mode 4 advantages, Martin 2006. See also: Edström 2006, p. 131. 
91  Dommen 2005, first paragraph. 
92  Dutch parliament: Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 574, nr. 3 (memorie van toelichting), 
p. 4. 
93  Dommen 2005, paragraph on wage and working conditions. The EU has firmly protected 
itself by indicating that ‘[a]ll other requirements of Community and Member States’ laws 
and regulations regarding entry, stay, work and social security measures shall continue to 
apply, including regulations concerning period of stay, minimum wages as well as collec-
tive wage agreements.’ EU schedule of commitments, horizontal section. 
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Conclusion 
Traditionally trade negotiations are aimed at the reduction of obstructive bor-
der measures. However, WTO obligations now ‘reach beyond the border’ and 
are increasingly aimed at the removal of barriers to trade derived from do-
mestic regulation. 
This paper has investigated the intention of two international legal orders 
to liberalize trade in services, including the movement of posted workers. In 
particular, it has sought to move beyond the implementation of specific norms. 
Both international agreements seek the creation of a level playing field for 
foreign and domestic competitors. Yet creating this level playing field for ser-
vices migration clearly requires a step far beyond the current level of openness 
in immigration and labour market policies. 
The EU legal order imperatively requires the Member States to take this 
required step. Contrary, the WTO legal order is based on progressive liberali-
zation reached through reciprocal trade negotiation. Studying the EU’s sched-
ule of specific commitments and the revised offer is extremely challenging due 
to an excessive amount of limitations, which moreover vary between the Mem-
ber States. The schedule and the negotiation process reveals considerate reluc-
tance to open this particular service market, a reluctance strongly influenced by 
proximity to labour market policies. 
As concerns relating to social dumping can be addressed through the ap-
plication of national and EU laws to posted employees, these concerns should 
not play the major role they currently have in developed countries. Potential 
gains from mode 4 liberalization are significant and WTO Member states have 
indicated their willingness to contribute to the migration-development nexus. 
Adding a few service sectors to a small list of heavily limited categories of 
natural persons providing services will make the process slow indeed. 
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